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INTRODUCTION
Determining whether class actions should be admissible in the
context of international commercial arbitration is a highly contentious
issue, both in theory and practice. As a dispute resolution mechanism
created by the parties’ consent and characterized by their direct
involvement in appointing the arbitrators and defining the procedure,
it is not clear how these essential features shall interplay in the
context of class arbitrations where the members of the class are bound
by the award regardless of their participation in the course of the
proceedings.1 The academic community has been unable to provide a
uniform understanding about the convenience of permitting class
arbitrations, and most international regulations are silent in regards to
its applicability. Accordingly, this Article attempts to contribute to the
study of international class arbitrations by providing a clear
framework for discussion, a description of the current status, and an
analysis of the specific challenges facing the development of class
actions in the field of international commercial arbitration.
I.

DEFINITION OF CLASS ACTION AND CLASS ARBITRATION

Class actions have been described as a procedural device
allowing plaintiffs to file a claim not only for themselves, but also on
behalf of other persons with the same interests.2 Although only the
representative is involved in the proceeding, the class members are
equally bound by the outcome.3
Class arbitration may be defined as a form of arbitration that
enables one or a number of parties to bring a claim before an arbitral
tribunal on behalf of others in a similar position. As it has generally
followed an analogous model to class action litigation, the party
1. JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
581 (2012).
2 . BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT,
MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 260 (2006).
3. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
154 (5th ed. 2009). Gary Born explains the concept of class actions in the United States in the
following terms: “Under the U.S. litigation system, a class action is a civil suit, often a mass
torts or consumer litigation, in which one or more named plaintiffs represent a large,
sometimes indeterminate, number of similarly-situated individuals in pursuing related claims
against one or more defendants.” Gary Born, The U.S. Supreme Court and Class Arbitration:
A Tragedy of Errors, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (July 1, 2011), http://kluwer
arbitrationblog.com/2011/07/01/the-u-s-supreme-court-and-class-arbitration-a-tragedy-oferrors/.
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initiating the proceeding asserts to represent a group of claimants.4
Class arbitration, while being a relatively recent phenomenon, is most
commonly viewed as a procedural mechanism mixing arbitration with
the class action procedures applicable under US litigation law. 5
Although it can be described as a hybrid between judicial class
actions and traditional arbitration, international class arbitration
presents some differences with both of them. It is different from
litigation because class arbitration applies the typical hallmarks of
arbitration, and in addition the class members are limited only to
those governed by similar arbitration agreements. 6 In turn, class
arbitration differs from traditional arbitration mainly because the class
representative seeks relief on behalf of other class members, and
therefore “issues that generally do not arise in arbitration, such as
certification of a class, issues of notice, [or] opting in/opting out”
actually do manifest themselves in class arbitration. 7 Since
international class arbitration could be administered by an arbitral

4. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 581.
5. Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration:
A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. OF DISP. RESOL. 1, 21 (2012), http://scholarship.law.missouri.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=jdr.
6. Michael Schafler & Amer Pasalic, Is Canada Ready for Class Arbitration?, ADRIC,
2, 3 (2013), http://www.dentons.com/en/~/media/B2160274017E49CCBE32401178504FB9.as
hx. As stated by another author: “Arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties in that
one cannot be required to submit to arbitration unless he has agreed to do so.” Martin
Saunders, Class Arbitrations – Who Decides?, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/class-arbitration-who-decides.
7. Schafler & Pasalic, supra note 6, at 2, 3. The authors explain the aforementioned with
these words:
It is different from a class action because it involves a type of representative
proceeding injected into the arbitral realm, and many of the classic hallmarks of
arbitration, including choice of decision-maker, customized procedures, and
confidentiality, would characterize class arbitration as well. Further, the arbitral
class in a class arbitration is restricted to parties governed by similar arbitration
agreements as the class arbitration representative. In other words, the claims
advanced in a class arbitration are limited by the nature of the contract in which the
arbitration agreement is found. On the other hand, class arbitration is different from
traditional arbitration because it can involve up to hundreds of thousands of parties
in a single proceeding, while most arbitrations are either bilateral in nature, or
involve relatively few parties at most. Whereas a traditional arbitration involves
claims advanced on behalf of a single party, a class arbitration involves a party
seeking relief on a representative basis. As a result, issues that generally do not arise
in arbitration, such as certification of a class, issues of notice, opting in/opting out,
etc. do manifest themselves in class arbitration.

2016]CLASS ACTIONS IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 795
institution or proceed on an ad hoc basis,8 it is uniquely placed to
efficiently provide a large number of individuals with the opportunity
to resolve their claims at a single time and in a neutral venue, before
an arbitral tribunal rather than domestic courts.9
II. CLASS ARBITRATION AS A FORM OF COLLECTIVE
REDRESS
The concept of collective redress encompasses “any mechanism
that may accomplish the cessation or prevention of unlawful business
practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation
for the harm caused by such practices.”10 It may pursue an injunctive
or compensatory purpose and can take a variety of forms.11A highly
popular form of collective redress is US-style class actions, and the
most well-known example in the field of alternative dispute resolution
is US domestic class arbitration. 12 As the international legal
community has shown an increasing interest in procedures that allow
resolving collective disputes, international commercial class
arbitration is a promising but yet-to-be-developed form of collective
redress.13
It is important to note that international class arbitration should
be distinguished from other types of multiparty proceedings, which in
general terms may be described as any dispute involving more than
two parties in the same arbitration. 14 As a matter of fact, class

8 . S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? StoltNielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 207 (2012)
[hereinafter Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?].
9. S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United
States and Canada Compared, 37 INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 921, 942 (2012) [hereinafter
Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration].
10 . What is Collective Redress, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L & COMP. L., http://www.
collectiveredress.org/collective-redress/what-is-collective-redress (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
11. Id.
12. S.I. Strong, Collective Arbitration Under the DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate
Law Disputes: A European Form of Class Arbitration?, 29 ASA BULLETIN 145, 145 (2011)
[hereinafter A European Form of Class Arbitration?].
13. S.I. Strong, Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, in
7 MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION, DOSSIERS OF THE ICC INST. OF WORLD BUS. L. 189 (Eric A.
Schwartz & Bernard Hanotiau eds., 2010) [hereinafter Class Arbitration Outside the UnitedStates: Reading the Tea Leaves].
14 . Ferdinando Emanuele & Milo Molfa, Multiparty Arbitrations: The Italian
Perspective, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP: THE EUR. AND MIDDLE EASTERN
ARB. REV. 64 (2012), http://www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/3ffa7c24-e013-440a-9c9a-
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arbitration usually determines the rights of a large numbers of parties
in a single process, the amounts at stake are very high, and the nature
of the claims involve parties who seek relief on a representative
basis. 15 Class arbitration differs from consolidated arbitrations 16
because the first is “contemplated when stakes in any individual case
remain small enough to make [individual] arbitration impractical from
a cost standpoint,”17 while consolidation involves different cases that
would proceed by themselves, but present “related parties as well as
common issues of law and fact, making it more economical for the
claims to be heard together by a single tribunal.”18 Additionally, in
class arbitrations the claimant asserts to represent other stakeholders
entitled to a similar recovery under analogous arbitration agreements,
while consolidations involve independent but related claims where no
individual is acting on behalf of the others. 19 Similarly, class
arbitrations need to be distinguished from the joinder of parties,
which implies the addition of a third party to the arbitration based on
a reference to the applicable rules or principles, such as implied
agency, piercing the corporate veil or the alter ego doctrine.20 Either
by adding a claimant or a respondent, the joinder does not change the
fact that traditional arbitration is unable to deal with cases of great
magnitude where the members of the class are so numerous that the
joinder of all of them is deemed impracticable.21
III. IS CLASS ARBITRATION DESIRABLE?
Class arbitration has been praised for increasing the efficiency
and reducing the costs of having to arbitrate numerous single claims.
2d8a32706de3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2e7939f0-865f-44b6-beac-30724bd41a41/
Multiparty%20Arbitrations_The%20Italian%20Perspective_2012.pdf.
15. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 21213.
16 . Consolidation of arbitrations has been defined in the following terms:
“[c]onsolidation is a procedural mechanism allowing for two or more claims to be united into
one single procedure concerning all related parties and disputes.” Lara Pair, Efficiency at All
Cost – Arbitration and Consolidation?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014), http://kluwerarb
itrationblog.com/2014/03/14/efficiency-at-all-cost-arbitration-and-consolidation/.
17 . WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 103
(2012).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 104.
21 . Gabrielle Nater-Bass, Class Action Arbitration: A New Challenge?, 27 ASA
BULLETIN 671, 671 (2009).
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Ultimately, it guarantees that all claimants are treated equally and
avoids the danger of conflicting decisions when different tribunals are
confronted with the same set of facts. Moreover, class arbitration
secures access to justice, as it provides claimants with the opportunity
to bring a claim when the individual amounts do not justify initiating
a proceeding.22 Finally, it also enables claimants to command more
resources by combining their cases, giving them “greater leverage by
compounding the defendant’s risk of loss.”23
Opponents of international class arbitrations have explained that
such procedures cannot maintain the informality, cost-efficiency,
speed, confidentiality and business-oriented methodology of
traditional arbitration, 24 and that they would require excessive
interference from domestic courts. In other words, that class
arbitrations would change the nature of arbitration.25 Additionally, it
has been argued that class arbitration is bad for business, 26 faces
enforcement uncertainties, and is unlikely to guarantee the validity of
the class members’ consent.27 Finally, some authors have mentioned
that class arbitration might not be admissible in civil law jurisdictions
where the idea of developing collective forms of actions is generally
rejected.28
The criticism towards international class arbitration is not
entirely accurate or admissible. Although class arbitration certainly
presents unique features, such circumstances do not change its arbitral
nature or the fact that international class arbitration is just another
type of arbitration proceeding within the arbitral realm.29 Indeed, the
areas “in which class arbitration differs most significantly from other
forms of multiparty arbitration—the provision of representative relief
and the underlying policy rationales—meet the standards” to be truly
considered as arbitration.30
22. Id. at 672.
23. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 260.
24. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13,
at 188.
25. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 202
(referencing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)).
26. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13,
at 186.
27. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 583.
28. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13,
at 187.
29. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 268.
30. Id. at 269.
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Furthermore, arguments in the sense that international class
arbitration includes excessive formalities and judicial involvement are
also unpersuasive as a means of supporting the argument that class
arbitration changes the fundamental nature of arbitration.31 It has been
explained that “arbitration is, and has long been, a highly diverse
form of dispute resolution, routinely including very formal, very large
and very complicated multi-party proceedings.”32 Additionally, it is
not certain that class arbitration would be bad for business, as
empirical studies have shown that corporations’ biggest criticism to
the procedure–that claimants file frivolous claims to force high
settlements–is demonstrably incorrect and based more on perception
than reality.33 Ultimately, the benefits that class arbitration can offer
to the development of international arbitration seem to outweigh any
potential risks, thus being desirable if applied under a proper
procedure. In any case, the study of international class arbitration is
extremely important because a growing number of commentators and
practitioners believe that it will spread beyond US borders without
necessarily adopting the same procedures as those used in US-style
class arbitrations.34
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ARBITRATIONS
A. United States
Class arbitrations have been broadly considered by the legal
community as a procedure distinctly used in the United States. Their
courts were pioneers in developing a regulatory framework applicable
to domestic class arbitrations. Arbitral institutions contributed to
further develop the applicable rules as well.35

31. Id.
32. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 22.
33. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note 13,
at 186.
34. S.I. Strong, From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, 26
ARB. INT’L 493, 494 (2010) [hereinafter From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of
Class Actions].
35 . Schafler & Pasalic, supra note 6, at 2 (citing Resolving Mass Legal Disputes
Through Class Arbitration, supra note 9, at 936).
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1. US Supreme Court and Class Arbitration
The development of class arbitrations in the United States can be
traced to the 1980s, when corporations started including arbitration
agreements in their standard forms of contracts, as a mechanism to
avoid class actions in the judicial context and force potential class
plaintiffs to individually resolve their disputes. This was a clear
attempt to limit the number of claims as well as the financial exposure
of the companies.36 As this situation was certainly abusive, US courts
began to compel arbitrations on a class basis, allowing a party to
bring a claim on behalf of a number of claimants (usually consumers)
similarly situated, against the same defendant and based on identical
arbitration agreements. 37 Domestic courts and arbitrators “began
ordering parties into class arbitration, with procedures reflecting the
individual preferences and concerns of different arbitral tribunals and
state courts.”38
However, class arbitration only became popular in 2003 after the
US Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle.39 The Court explained that it was for the arbitrator to decide
whether class arbitration was allowed or not,40 that is to say “whether
an arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration was an issue that
arbitrators, not courts, were to decide.” 41 Additionally, Bazzle ruled
that class arbitration could be available even if the arbitration
agreement was silent about when class arbitration was implicitly
contemplated by the parties.42 The commented decision lead to the
creation of special class arbitration rules by two well-known arbitral
institutions: (i) the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”); and (ii) the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) 43 Class Actions

36.
at 497.
37.
38.
at 498.
39.
40.
(2013).
41.
42.
43.

From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 21-22.
From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
539 U.S. 444 (2003).
Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT. L. REV. 419, 430-31
Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 22.
Born, supra note 3.
JAMS Inc. (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service Inc.).
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Procedures. 44 The importance of the Green Tree decision for the
development of class arbitration has been illustrated as follows:
While there is evidence to suggest that class arbitration has been
in existence in the U.S. since at least the early 1980s, the device
gained significant traction across the United States only in 2003,
when the United States Supreme Court implicitly approved the
procedure in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle. 45

In 2010, the US Supreme Court took a different approach to
class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.46 The context of this case was that the arbitrators had concluded
that class arbitration was permissible even though the parties had
agreed that the arbitration agreement was silent as to the availability
of such a procedure. After granting certiorari, the US Supreme Court
analyzed whether imposing class arbitration was consistent with the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 47 deciding that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority by allowing class arbitration because “the
arbitrators could not have interpreted the parties’ contract to allow
class arbitration” when they had accepted that the arbitration clause
was silent in this regard. 48 In other words, where an arbitration
agreement is undoubtedly silent about class arbitration, that procedure
shall not be permissible because there are no contractual grounds for
concluding that the parties agreed to arbitrate on a class-wide basis.49
Finally, while some commentators consider that the US Supreme
Court reversed the Bazzle ruling that the arbitrators should determine
whether the parties had consented to class arbitration,50 others have
argued that the decision only narrowed the possibility to conclude that
the parties contemplated class arbitration, but that such determination
“remains one for the arbitral tribunal to make in the first

44. Rachael Kent & Marik String, Availability of Class Arbitration Under US Law, in 18
ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, 853, 856 (2015).
45. Schafler & Pasalic, supra note 6, at 2. Or as stated by another author: “Through a
quick analysis of the USA’s experience, it is possible to see that in the wake of Bazzle v. Green
Tree, in 2003, hundreds of class arbitrations were administrated before the main Arbitration
Centres, such as AAA and JAMS.” Romulo Greff Mariani, Class Arbitrations in Brazil?.
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/05/14/classarbitrations-in-brazil/.
46. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
47. Kent & String, supra note 44, at 859.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Born, supra note 3.
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instance.” 51 Subsequently in 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepción, the US Supreme Court addressed the validity of class
arbitration waivers.52 The case involved an arbitration arising from a
federal court action brought by consumers against the manufacturer of
mobile phones, where the standard form contract provided for
arbitration but prohibited class proceedings.53 The US Supreme Court
ruled that the FAA preempts state laws invalidating class arbitration
waivers54 freely agreed by the parties.55
The impact of the US Supreme Court decisions in Stolt-Nielsen
SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp and in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepción for the development of class arbitrations has been
explained as follows:
A decade later [after the decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.
v. Bazzle], however, the Supreme Court issued two decisions that
performed a fairly complete about-face, effectively overruling its
earlier holding in Bazzle and largely closing the door on class
arbitration under the FAA. In StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., the Court held that class arbitration was only
permissible in contracts that affirmatively provided for this
procedure. That holding substantially undercut both the Court’s
earlier decision in Bazzle and the burgeoning growth of class
arbitrations. More recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepción, the Court upheld class waiver provisions in
arbitration agreements against unconscionability challenges.56

In 2013, the US Supreme Court decided the Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter case, where it upheld the decision of an arbitrator
stating that class arbitration was permitted by the parties’ arbitration
clause, even though the arbitration agreement did not expressly allow
class arbitration. 57 The Court differentiated this case from StoltNielsen, explaining that on that occasion, the parties accepted that
they never reached an agreement on class arbitration, making it
impossible for the panel to allow class arbitration based on the
51 . George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 1, 45 (2012).
52. 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see Kent & String, supra note 44, at 860.
53. PARK, supra note 17, at 98.
54. Abigail Rubenstein, Arbitration Contracts Can Ban Class Actions: High Court, LAW
360 (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/241700/arbitration-contracts-can-banclass-actions-high-court.
55. Mariani, supra note 45.
56. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 22.
57. 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013); Kent & String, supra note 44.
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parties’ intent. On the contrary, in Oxford Health that issue was in
dispute and the parties assigned the arbitrator the task of interpreting
the arbitration agreement.58 Accordingly, the US Supreme Court was
deferential to the arbitrator’s decision that the agreement permitted
class arbitration.59 That decision “preserves the role of arbitrators in
determining whether the parties have agreed to class arbitration, and
ensures that such decisions survive the limited judicial review”
allowed by the FAA. 60 Only ten days after Oxford Health, in the
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant case, the US
Supreme Court issued another decision revisiting the validity of
waiving the possibility of class arbitration proceedings, rejecting the
challenge against a class arbitration waiver.61
Finally, regarding the judicial history of class arbitration in the
United States, it is worth noticing that a number of procedures with
international scope already exist in that country, 62 namely, the
Harvard College v. Surgutneftegaz case involving a defendant based
in Russia, the CBR Enterprises LLC v. Blimpie International Inc. case
concerning several US defendants with international holdings that
might be subject to enforcement orders, and the Bagpeddler.com v.
US Bancorp case also involving non-US claimants as part of a class
of more than 400,000 Internet vendors. 63
Ultimately, what the future of class arbitration will be in the
United States is not clear among the legal community. The US
Supreme Court decisions have somehow limited the applicability of
58. Id.
59. Ted Howes & Hannah Banks, A Tale of Two Arbitration Clauses: The Lessons of
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter for the Future of Class-Action Arbitration in the United
States, 30 J. OF INT’L ARB. 727, 732 (2013).
60. Matthew A. Lee & Lucas Bento, Class Arbitration In The United States Survives
Another Battle, But Will It Survive The War?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 21, 2013), http://
kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/06/21/class-arbitration-in-the-united-states-survives-anotherbattle-but-will-it-survive-the-war/.
61. Kent & String, supra note 44.
62. Lea Haber Kuck & Gregory A. Litt, International Class Arbitration, in WORLD
CLASS ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE
711 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/
Chapter%2030%20%20International%20Class%20Arbitration.pdf.
63. S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process
and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. OF INT’L L. 4, 5 (2008) [hereinafter Enforcing Class
Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns];
Surgutneftegaz v. President and Fellows of Harv. Coll., No. 04 Civ. 6069, 2007 WL 3019234
(S.D.N.Y 2007); CBR Enter., LLC v. Blimpie Int’l, Inc. (Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Apr. 19,
2006); Bagpeddler.com v. U.S. Bancorp, Case No. 11 181 0032204 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n,
May 4, 2007).
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class arbitration. Some have even argued that the FAA should be
construed as not allowing class arbitration at all.64
2. Institutional Procedures on Class Arbitrations: The AAA and
JAMS
As stated before, the US Supreme Court ruling in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle lead institutions such as AAA and JAMS to
create special class arbitration rules.65 In 2004, the AAA issued a plan
explaining that it would administer class arbitrations according to
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration if the arbitration
agreement is silent with respect to class claims but specifies that
disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement shall be resolved by
arbitration in accordance with the AAA Rules.66 The AAA procedure
adapts the requirements of class actions to the nature of traditional
arbitration, including special decisions regarding the applicability of
class arbitrations under the arbitration clause, the suitability for the
arbitration to proceed as class arbitration and the practice of notices to
the potential members of the class, among several other issues. Rule 3
of the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations establishes that
“[u]pon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold
matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the
arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits
the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class.” 67 The
decision is known as the Clause Construction Award.68 Following the
Clause Construction Award, the arbitrator shall stay all proceedings
“for a period of at least thirty days to permit any party to move a court
of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate” the decision.69 Once
all parties inform in writing that they are not seeking judicial review
of such award or the time period expires, “the arbitrator may proceed
with the arbitration on the basis stated in the Clause Construction
Award.”70

65. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
66. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 277.
67. Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N, INC. (2011), https://
www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/
~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf[hereinafter Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the AAA].
68. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 277.
69. Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the AAA, supra note 67.
70. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 277.
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In accordance with Rule 4 of the said norms, if the arbitrator
considers that
the arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed as a class
arbitration . . . or where a court has ordered that an arbitrator
determine whether a class arbitration may be maintained, the
arbitrator shall determine whether the arbitration should proceed
as a class arbitration. . . . In doing so, the arbitrator shall
determine whether one or more members of a class may act in the
arbitration as representative parties on behalf of all members of
the class described.71

According to Rule 5, that determination has to “be set forth in a
reasoned, partial final award,” known as the “Class Determination
Award.” The same rule establishes that the arbitrator “shall stay all
proceedings following the issuance of the Class Determination Award
for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a court of
competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Class
Determination Award.”72 If all parties inform the arbitrator in writing
that they do not intend to seek judicial review of the Class
Determination Award, or once the requisite time period expires
without any party having informed the arbitrator that it has done so,
the arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration on the basis stated in
the Class Determination Award.
According to Rule 6 of the commented norms, “the arbitrator
shall, after expiration of the stay following the Class Determination
Award, direct that class members be provided the best notice
practicable under the circumstances.” That decision is called “Notice
of Class Determination,” and “shall be given to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort.” 73 Rule 8 regulates issues
related to settlements, voluntary dismissals and compromise.
Regarding confidentiality, Rule 10 establishes that the “presumption
of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not
apply in class arbitrations,” making public all class arbitration
hearings and filings. Moreover, the AAA maintains on its web site a
“Class Arbitration Docket of arbitrations filed as class arbitrations,”
providing some information related to the proceeding.74

71.
72.
73.
74.

Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the AAA, supra note 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The JAMS Class Actions Procedures is similar to the AAA
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations and provides a further
attempt to adapt the practice of judicial class actions to the special
features of arbitration. 75 Similar to the AAA procedure, under the
JAMS rules, the arbitrator has to determine whether the arbitration is
allowed to proceed as a class action.76 As stated, the arbitrator “shall
determine as a threshold matter whether the arbitration can proceed
on behalf of or against a class” and “shall set forth his or her
determination with respect to the matter of clause construction in a
partial final award subject to immediate court review.”77
The main difference between the JAMS and the AAA rules is
that the AAA rules “mandat[e] that an arbitrator write separate awards
embodying the arbitrator’s decisions on clause construction and class
certification and then wait after each award for a period of at least
thirty days to permit any party to apply to a court to confirm or to
vacate the award,” while the JAMS procedure leaves the arbitrator “to
decide whether to embody his or her decisions on clause construction
and class certification in partial final awards subject to immediate
judicial review.” 78 Another relevant difference is that the rules
adopted by JAMS do not contain an explicit provision regarding the
confidentiality of the class arbitration proceeding. The applicability of
these domestic proceedings is limited. As a matter of fact, it has been
noted that the AAA and the JAMS class arbitration rules are only
applicable to domestic class arbitrations. These rules are not available
for international class arbitration proceedings.79
B. Situation in Countries Other than the United States
Numerous civil and common law jurisdictions in Europe and
America have adopted or are considering adopting mechanisms of
collective redress for group injuries under their domestic
regulations. 80 In recent years various European countries have
established specific regulations in their legal systems to “allow a
75. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
76. Id.
77. JAMS Class Actions, JAMS, 2 (May 1, 2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf.
78. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 279.
79. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
80. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
at 500.
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group of plaintiffs to litigate similar claims in one action.” 81 For
instance, in Sweden the so-called group actions are admissible since
2003 under the Group Proceedings Act. This norm considers an opt-in
mechanism, as “group actions may be asserted by any class member
or specially appointed organization where the action is based on
circumstances that are common or similar to the claims of the
members of the group and where the applicant is in a financial
position to pursue the claims.”82 In an empirical research conducted in
2008, a professor concluded that although it was too soon to
adequately analyze the impacts of the commented law, no information
showed that the fears of business were justified.83
Another example is the United Kingdom, where group litigations
regarding claims giving rise to common issues of fact or law have
been allowed since 2000. Courts in the UK may issue a group
litigation order “establishing a register on which the relevant claims
will be entered and specifying which court will manage the claims.”84
Subsequently, additional claimants may opt-in by filing an individual
claim and existing parties are entitled to opt-out, as the final decision
is binding only regarding those registered.85 Other countries that have
adopted rules allowing groups of plaintiffs to litigate similar claims in
the same proceeding are Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany,
Spain, and Italy.86
In addition to the United States, class arbitrations have been
developing in other parts of the Americas. The evidence shows one
case in Colombia as well as court decisions in other countries, such as
Canada. 87 Under the Colombian case, Valencia v. Bancolombia, a
tribunal in Bogotá faced a class action initiated by shareholders due to
the merger of two financial institutions.88 The claimants argued that
class actions in Colombia were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the domestic courts, but the Colombian Supreme Court rejected that
81. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
82. Id. (citing GROUP PROCEEDING ACT §§ 4-6).
83. See Per Henrik Lindblom, Global Class Actions: National Report: Group Litigation
in Sweden, Update Paper Sections 2.5 and 3, 20 (2008), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/documents/Sweden_Update_paper_Nov%20-08.pdf.
84. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62.
88 . Valencia (Colombia) v. Bancolombia (Colombia), (Apr. 24, 2003) - Arbitral
Tribunal from the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, digest by Eduardo Zuleta for Institute of
Transnational Arbitration (“ITA”).

2016]CLASS ACTIONS IN INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 807
argument on the grounds that the arbitration agreement (contained in
the by-laws of one of the financial institutions) did not limit the types
of claims that could be submitted to arbitration, and accordingly, it
also included class arbitration. Although the Colombian Supreme
Court did not go as far as affirming that class arbitrations are broadly
permitted in Colombia, it allowed the arbitrators to decide whether
“the existence of an arbitration agreement in a common shareholder
agreement could give rise to a collective claim.”89
Canada has also dealt with class arbitrations. The Canadian
experience is a clear reflection of the way domestic regulations
influence the development of class arbitration, as the courts have
struggled with the letter and purpose of the legislation regarding both
class relief and the availability of arbitration. As explained, to some
extent the outcome depends “on whether the courts decide that ‘the
right at issue is . . . a right to sue on a class-wide basis before the
courts’ or whether ‘the right conferred by class action legislation is
simply a right to proceed on a class-wide basis,’ regardless of the
venue.”90
Commentators from other countries where class arbitrations
have not yet been developed are showing openness towards these
kinds of procedures as well. For instance, an author stated the
following:
Despite the peculiarities of the USA’s experience, if compared to
Brazilian law, it suggests that such a discussion is definitely
interesting and can lead to solutions for the issues that, at first,
seem to make the practice of class arbitration almost impossible.
This might indeed be the new frontier for the Brazilian arbitration
to explore.91

Ultimately, other forms of collective redress sharing some similarities
with US-style class arbitrations may be observed under the
Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes drafted by the
German Institution of Arbitration,92 or in the consumer-related Law
231/2008 in Spain. 93 Nevertheless, the method of analysis used by
89. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
at 498.
90. Id.
91. Mariani, supra note 45.
92. A European Form of Class Arbitration?, supra note 12.
93. S.I. Strong, Collective Consumer Arbitration in Spain: A Civil Law Response to USStyle Class Arbitration?, 30 J. OF INT’L ARB. 493, 495-510 (2013) [hereinafter Collective
Consumer Arbitration in Spain].
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Canadian or Colombian courts, as well as in other jurisdictions,
demonstrates that the development of class arbitration will not
necessarily rely on analogies to the United States approach.94
C. International Framework
The rules of arbitration of the most renowned arbitral institutions
are silent in regards to class arbitration. In many crucial points current
regulations–such as the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”)
Rules of Arbitration or the London Court of International Arbitration
(“LCIA”) Rules–cannot serve the purpose of providing an effective
framework for international class arbitration proceedings because
there are no guidelines governing class certification, class
representative, notices, confidentiality or advances for costs, among
other issues.95 International treaties are equally silent.
As a matter of fact, arbitral tribunals and institutions acting in
the field of transnational disputes “have permitted large, consolidated
arbitrations, but have not embraced class arbitration.”96 In 2005, the
ICC even issued a statement taking the position that class action
litigation has “adverse consequences for business and consumers,
outweighing the perceived benefits to society.”97 If this is the opinion
of the ICC regarding class action litigation, it is highly likely that the
arbitral institution might not support international class arbitrations.
Several problems may arise because of the lack of an appropriate
regulatory regime. Delays, challenges and the potential
unenforceability of class arbitration awards would negatively affect
the development of class arbitration within the field of international
commercial arbitration.98 However, some type of collective relief has
been observed in the field of international investment arbitration, for
instance, in an International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”) case filed by more than 190,000 Italian parties
against Argentina. 99 As explained in the Abaclat v. Argentine
Republic ICSID award, “collective proceedings emerged where they
94.
at 498.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
at 495.

From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62.
Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
Id.
From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
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constituted the only way to ensure an effective remedy in protection
of a substantive right provided by contract or law.”100 The Abaclat
decision acknowledged that each individual claimant consented to
ICSID arbitration and was fully identified, differentiating the
proceedings from US-style class actions in which a representative
“initiates a proceeding in the name of a class composed of an
undetermined number of unidentified claimants” and concluding that
the case seemed “to be a sort of a hybrid kind of collective
proceedings, in the sense that it starts as aggregate proceedings, but
then continues with features similar to representative proceedings due
to the high number of claimants involved.” 101 Another mass
arbitration was conducted under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty by
the shareholders of a Russian oil company.102
V. CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL CLASS ARBITRATION
International class arbitration must address significant challenges
in order to become a predictable and fair mechanism to resolve
transnational business disputes. 103 This section identifies some of
those hazards by classifying them into four different categories: (a)
conceptual challenges; (b) issues related to the arbitration agreement;
(c) procedural concerns that should be solved; and (d) problems that
could appear in the enforcement stage of a class arbitration award.104
A. Conceptual Challenges
1. Representative Relief
The arbitration community has discussed whether representative
relief constitutes a neutral procedure providing the parties with an
opportunity to be heard, 105 which is expected in any arbitration
proceeding. As a matter of fact, one of the most important
100. Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 190 (Aug. 4, 2011).
101. Id. at 191.
102. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Actions, supra note 34,
at 495.
103 . Roman Khodykin, Class Arbitration: Is There an Appetite for It in Europe?,
LEXOLOGY (May 14, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=45971385-112d47dd-b6b4-40863e0128ca
104 . Several of the challenges that will be identified in the following lines are
interrelated between them, even if classified in different categories.
105. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 266.
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requirements for any international commercial arbitration is that both
parties must be treated fairly and equally, providing them with the
opportunity to argue their positions and present their case.106 Indeed,
Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law–which has been adopted in
seventy States in a total of 100 jurisdictions– 107 confirms that the
parties shall be treated with equality, giving them a full opportunity to
adequately present their case.
Class arbitration raises several challenges in connection with
consent and the involvement of the class members in the proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that some States with strong
regulatory regimes have traditionally taken a position against
representative relief because–they claim–US class actions and similar
procedures “are an abuse of individual rights.”108 It would certainly be
impracticable that the members of the class should be expected to
agree on the appointment of the arbitrators and the applicable
procedure, especially in cases where class actions are structured under
opting-out mechanisms rather than opting in. As an active
involvement from all class members would be inefficient, it is
submitted that allowing intermediaries to bring claims for
representative relief could solve some of the problems in connection
with the appointment of the arbitrator, opt-in versus opt-out, notice
requirements or even the res judicata effect of class arbitration
awards.
2. Privacy and Confidentiality
Confidentiality is an important feature of international
commercial arbitration.109 According to a survey that ranked eleven
perceived benefits of international arbitration, confidentiality obtained
the third place.110 Meanwhile, a clear majority of in-house counsels
106. Alan Redfern, The Practical Distinction Between the Burden of Proof and the
Taking of Evidence, in 10 THE STANDARDS AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 321 (1994).
107. Status of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
UNCITRAL (as amended, 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
1985Model_arbitration_status.html.
108. Class Arbitration Outside the United-States: Reading the Tea Leaves, supra note
13, at 201.
109. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 103
110 . 2013 International Arbitration Survey: Corporate Choices in International
Arbitration Industry Perspectives, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS (2013), http://www.
arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123282.pdf.
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(eighty-four percent) recognized choosing international arbitration in
part because of that characteristic of the procedure.111Class arbitration
might pose a problem in this regard, as confidentiality would be
undermined due to the need of providing information to the public.112
The fact that class arbitrations are aimed to affect a broad number of
parties implies that it “must deviate from strict application of the
principles of privacy and confidentiality, at least to some extent.”113
Indeed, relevant information ought to be disclosed to potential parties,
especially if the procedure considers an opt-out mechanism because
“the consequences of failing to opt out of a collective proceeding are
more burdensome than the consequences of failing to opt in.”114 As
the US Supreme Court explained in the Stolt-Nielsen case, “the
presumption of privacy and confidentiality that applies in many
bilateral arbitrations shall not apply in class arbitrations, thus
potentially frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they agreed to
arbitrate.”115
However, it is important to note that confidentiality is not
universally considered an essential or characteristic feature of
arbitration.116 Privacy and confidentiality are not deemed an “absolute
protection as a matter of national or international law.”117 Moreover,
court decisions have suggested that “the principles of privacy and
confidentiality can be overcome in situations where there is some
public interest at stake.”118

111. Id.
112. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
113. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration, supra note
34, at 514.
114 . Id. at 513. As explained by the author, the “[f]ailure to opt out leads to the
extinguishment of a claim, whereas failure to opt in allows an individual claim to survive, even
if the party cannot take advantage of a positive result arising out of the initial proceeding.” Id.
at n.109.
115. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010).
116. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 583.
117. From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration, supra note
34, at 514.
118. Id. (citing Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation: UPS
v. Canada and Methanex Corporation v. United States, 21 ARB. INT’L 211, 211–12 (2005);
Andrew Tweeddale, Confidentiality in Arbitration and the Public Interest Exception, 21 ARB.
INT’L 59, 59–60 (2005); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of
Investor-State Arbitration through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52
MCGILL L. J. 681, 708–20 (2007).
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3. Efficiency and Informality
Concerns have also been raised in connection with the efficiency
of class arbitration when compared with judicial class actions,
particularly in relation with hearings or notice to class members, all of
which will require an important amount of time for the proceeding to
be conducted properly. This is not a minor issue, as noted from the
words of an author stating that most “arbitration lawyers and users of
arbitration services would probably agree that efficiency is a key issue
in international arbitration, or that efficiency of arbitration is a key
issue.” 119 Some have explained that efficiency problems may be
easily solved by allowing only the representative together with a class
counsel to participate in the proceedings, rather than “each individual
party for himself, with his own lawyer.”120
In addition, class arbitration faces the challenge of requiring a
higher number of formalities,121 such as those required to give proper
notice to the potential members of a class. The concern that class
arbitration might jeopardize the informality of the arbitration
procedure can be observed in the US Supreme Court decision of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, where the court held that “[r]equiring
the availability of class wide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with
the FAA.” 122 However, as previously explained in this Article,
arguments in the sense that international class arbitration includes
excessive formalities are “unpersuasive as a means of supporting the
claim that class arbitration affects the fundamental nature of
arbitration.”123
Besides acknowledging that class arbitration has unique features
that should be addressed when organizing the proceeding, it is
important to note that informality has not been universally considered
an essential or characteristic feature of arbitration. 124 Moreover,
traditional arbitrations are sometimes conducted under a complex
frame that can be even more formal than a class arbitration procedure.
119. Veijo Heiskanen, Key to Efficiency in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (May 29, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/05/29/key-to-efficiency-ininternational-arbitration/.
120. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
121. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 255.
122. Kent & String, supra note 44.
123. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 269.
124. WAINCYMER, supra note 1, at 583.
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As stated, “arbitration is, and has long been, a highly diverse form of
dispute resolution, routinely including very formal, very large and
very complicated multi-party proceedings.”125
B.

Challenges Related to the Arbitration Agreement

1. Consent and Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
An essential requirement of a valid and effective arbitration
proceeding is the existence of an agreement between the parties to
submit their disputes to arbitration rather than litigation before
domestic courts. Accordingly, the first condition that any class
arbitration needs to comply with is showing that the arbitration
agreement is valid and enforceable.126
The applicable laws at the seat of arbitration will generally have
different rules regarding the formal requirements of the arbitration
agreement. However, all jurisdictions accept that “only parties that
have actually agreed to arbitrate their disputes can be compelled to
arbitration proceedings.”127 For instance, the French Supreme Court
supported the position that “the validity of an arbitration agreement
should be determined primarily in light of the common intent of the
parties.”128Therefore, the key challenge to class arbitrations does not
lie in the formal validity requirements of the arbitration agreement–
which might not vary with respect to a traditional arbitration. Rather,
it lies in determining whether the class members actually consented to
submit their disputes to arbitration and to the particular type of
procedure that is class arbitration.129 This might be a problem in optout systems, where the members of the class “may not have actual
notice of the arbitration, and are thus unable to raise their objections
to the arbitration clause, but will nevertheless be bound by any award
rendered in the arbitration.”130
125. Born & Salas, supra note 5, at 21.
126. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
127. Id. at 681.
128. Christophe Von Krause, Agreement: The French Supreme Court Confirms that the
Validity of an Arbitration Agreement Depends Primarily on the Common Intent of the Parties,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 27, 2010), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2010/01/27/existenceand-validity-of-an-arbitration-agreement-the-french-supreme-court-confirms-that-the-validityof-an-arbitration-agreement-depends-primarily-on-the-common-intent-of-the-parties/.
129. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 25253.
130. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
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2. Who Decides Whether an Arbitration Agreement Allows Class
Arbitration?
As previously noted in this Article, the academic community in
the United States has different opinions on whether it is for the courts
or the arbitrators to decide if a particular arbitration agreement allows
class arbitration.131 The existence of the referred discussion suggests
that a similar one could occur in the context of international class
arbitrations. In this regard, the better view seems to suggest that
arbitrators should make that decision, in line with the principle of
kompetenz-kompetenz, 132 which provides that arbitrators have the
power to decide on their own jurisdiction. 133 Accordingly, it is
submitted that they should have the authority to decide whether an
arbitration clause allows class arbitration or not. Moreover, this
approach is confirmed by the fact that the party resisting class
arbitration–at least in US procedures–usually contends that such a
mechanism was not contemplated in the arbitration agreement, but
generally “do not contest the authority of the arbitral tribunal to make
that determination.”134

131. See Should Class Arbitration Be Decided by a Court or an Arbitrator?, MUNGER,
TOLLES & OLSON LLP (2015), http://www.mto.com/news/headlines/2015/should-classarbitration-be-decided-by-a-court-or-an-arbitrator. Another author explains the case of
California in the following terms:
Two districts of the California Court of Appeal recently issued significant decisions
on arbitration agreements. In a published case, the Fourth Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeal held that if the arbitration agreement is silent on whether
the agreement allows for class or representative arbitration, then courts should
decide the gateway issue of whether class arbitration is allowed. In the second
unpublished decision, the Second Appellate District of the California Court of
Appeal held that the issue of class arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide.
Spencer C. Skeen & Ameneh K. Ernst, Who Decides the Issue of Class Arbitration?,
LEXOLOGY (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=559cd79f-ecdb4f74-9448-e1e7285165fb.
132. João Bosco Lee, Is the Competence-Competence Principle Threatened in Brazil?,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/03/19/is-thecompetence-competence-principle-threatened-in-brazil/.
133 . Regarding this principle, it has been stated the following: “As a theoretical
principle, it is widely accepted to have a dual effect. While its positive effect confers upon an
arbitral tribunal the power to rule on its jurisdiction, the negative effect establishes a
presumption of chronological priority for the tribunal with respect to resolving jurisdiction
questions.” Pratyush Panjwani & Harshad Pathak, Assimilating the Negative Effect of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz in India: Need to Revisit the Question of Judicial Intervention, INDIAN
J. FOR ARB. L. 1, 1 (2013), http://ijal.in/sites/default/files/Harshad.pdf.
134. Bermann, supra note 51, at 47.
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3. Silent Arbitration Clauses: Do They Prohibit or Authorize Class
Arbitrations?
The United States experience shows a potential problem arising
from initiating a class action under an arbitration agreement that is
silent about class arbitration proceedings. This discussion—whether
silent arbitration clauses prohibit or authorize class arbitration—is a
highly sensitive challenge for the development of international class
arbitration because most arbitration agreements are silent in regards to
such type of proceedings. Domestic courts in different jurisdictions
might interpret the issue dissimilarly. Although it is possible to
submit that the legal community should address the issue with a proarbitration approach, so far it is advisable for those interested in
allowing class arbitrations to expressly consider that possibility in
their arbitration agreements.135
4. Are Class Arbitration Waivers Admissible?
The parties could also exclude the possibility of class arbitration
in the arbitration agreement. However, these waivers should be
analyzed to prevent abuses from companies that intend to avoid class
actions by inserting arbitration agreements in their contracts while at
the same time excluding any form of class or group arbitration. As a
matter of fact, some courts in the United States have overridden class
action waivers as violative of substantive rights.136 Furthermore, the
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that at least regarding
antitrust issues, contractual waivers of class action arbitration were
unenforceable because they prevented potential claimants from
enforcing their rights.137 While it is questionable whether the decision
of the US Court of Appeals may be transferred to other areas of the
law,138 it is important to consider that the US Supreme Court already
recognized the general validity of class arbitration waivers in the
AT&T Mobility LLC and the American Express Co. cases. 139
135. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
136. Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack? Exploring the Recent Judicial
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal
Landscape, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 492-500 (2009).
137. Nater-Bass, supra note 21.
138. Id.
139. Kent & String, supra note 44. As concluded by the authors from US Supreme Court
decisions: “express waivers of class arbitrations are permissible, even in contracts of
adhesion.”
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However, the legal community seems to agree that if a corporation
tries to impose a clause that would “preclude the use of class actions
in any forum,” such a clause is deemed to be “unenforceable by the
courts in most cases, either on the basis of the unconscionability
theory, or because it contravenes the terms, legislative history or
purpose of a specific statute.”140
5. Arbitrability of the Dispute
Most international treaties and regulations allow States to
determine whether a dispute is arbitrable or not; in other words, to
decide if “specific classes of disputes are barred from arbitration.”141
The issue of arbitrability is aimed to examine whether specific claims
are capable of settlement by arbitration or if they must be decided by
a domestic court under the laws of the seat of arbitration or where the
enforcement of the award is being sought.142
Article II(1) of the New York Convention establishes that
contracting States shall recognize an arbitration agreement
“concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration,”143
while Article V(2)(a) of the same convention provides that
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if
the “subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement.”144
On the other hand, Article 1(5) of the UNCITRAL Model Law leaves
matters of arbitrability to the decision of each jurisdiction, as States
take different views on the subject and may “fill in the arbitrability
provision” as they deem appropriate.145
Accordingly, the development of international arbitration as a
mechanism to resolve class disputes faces the challenge of not being
supported under the applicable laws, as domestic regulations are fully
capable of limiting the scope of class arbitration to certain substantive
matters or declaring that class arbitrations are non-arbitrable at all. As
explained by an author addressing the validity of the arbitration
agreement in class actions: “Another requirement of substantive
140. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 270.
141. Laurence Shore, Defining Arbitrability: The United States vs. the Rest of the World,
N.Y. L. J. (June 15, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/shoredefiningarbitrability.pdf (referring to the concept of “arbitrability” outside the United States).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Stavros L. Brekoulakis, John Ribeiro & Laurence Shore, UNCITRAL Model Law, in
CONCISE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 836, 842 (Loukas A. Mistelis ed., 2d ed. 2015).
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validity of the arbitration agreement that may create obstacles for
class arbitrations is arbitrability. Applicable provisions limiting the
scope of potential arbitrations may cause problems as well.”146
Generally, it is submitted that any doubt on the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 147 For
instance, in Switzerland, it is contested whether a dispute regarding
consumer law is arbitrable and also whether state courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over such types of disputes.148 Such enquiries
should be analyzed with a pro-arbitration approach.
C. Procedural Challenges
1. Due Process and Public Policy Concerns
Due process is an essential element in international arbitration,
and its importance for the arbitral process has been widely
acknowledged by the legal community. 149 Class arbitration raises
several due process concerns in connection with the appointment of
arbitrators and the notice requirements, among others. To address
these issues some authors have proposed that the proceedings should
be subject to court supervision for guaranteeing that the parties’
procedural rights are adequately taken into consideration. This
approach reflects some lack of confidence in arbitration, especially
because arbitrators and arbitral institutions are adequately prepared to
address any procedural challenge to ensure a reliable and efficient
proceeding.150
Experienced arbitrators are well prepared to guarantee the
protection of the parties’ due process rights in all types of arbitrations.
Accordingly, the role of domestic courts in class arbitrations should
be limited in accordance with the principle of minimum intervention,
just like in any other international arbitration conducted on an
individual basis. As stated, it is “beyond doubt that class actions are
complex procedures but arbitrations in general tend to be more and
more intricate without this increasing complexity raising

146. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 25.
147. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 266.
148. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 25.
149. See Matti S. Kurkela, Due Process in Arbitration: A Finnish Perspective, 21 J. OF
INT’L ARB. 221, 224 (2004).
150. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 27-28.
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insurmountable problems for arbitration experts.”151 This is why some
authors have explained that “no particular due process concerns
against class action arbitration should be raised and no particular
measures such as the possibility for court intervention/supervision
should be taken.”152
2. Selection of Arbitrators
The possibility to select the arbitrator has long been considered a
fundamental right in international arbitration. 153 Originally, many
multiparty proceedings failed to materialize when there were more
than two parties to the dispute, as the rules for appointing arbitrators
only contemplated bilateral proceedings in which each party was
entitled to select its own arbitrator, with the chair to be nominated by
the two party appointments or by the arbitral institution. As a result,
many domestic laws and international rules now provide that a neutral
institution or domestic court “can appoint the entire tribunal in cases
where the parties cannot themselves agree on individual panelists or
selection procedures.”154
The appointment can certainly be difficult in class arbitrations or
other multi-party proceedings where there are several persons
involved as claimants or defendants. 155 Unnamed class members “do
not officially become parties to the proceeding unless and until they
have each been given the option of joining the action.” 156 The
challenge is to accept that absent class members do not have the
possibility to select their arbitrator as usually the class representatives
make the appointment on behalf of all the members and, similarly,
that the defendant is deprived of the possibility to appoint its
arbitrator for each individual dispute.157
However, it is submitted that class arbitration protects the
parties’ fundamental right to select the arbitrators, at least in opt-in
procedures. Unnamed class members who choose to participate in the
proceedings will somehow ratify the choice of arbitrators made by the
class representative, and potential class members who choose not to
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 276.
Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 28.
Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 231.
Id. at 232.
A European Form of Class Arbitration?, supra note 12, at 59.
Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 233.
Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 27.
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join the proceedings will not be affected by the award and
consequently by the appointment.158 The fact that a respondent would
not be able to select an arbitrator for each individual dispute does not
change this conclusion, as it can be argued that by consenting to class
arbitration the respondent also accepted the dispute to be resolved in a
unique proceeding before a single arbitral tribunal.
3. Notice Requirements and Certification Process: Opt-in or Optout?
As a decision rendered in a class arbitration is binding on all
members of the class, 159 international class arbitration may be
structured under an opt-in or an opt-out system. The opt-in system is
applied whenever the party “must affirmatively signal that he or she
wishes to join the class,” while the opt-out approach refers to the
mechanism in which “the party is assumed to be part of the class
unless he or she indicates otherwise.”160 As collective proceedings are
designed to resolve mass disputes, it is important that the
effectiveness of the award is not hindered by arguments about who is
bound by the proceeding.161
One of the challenges facing class arbitration is that the class
members might not be aware that a claim is pending or that they are
allowed to opt-out of the class action and file a claim individually. In
an attempt to address these concerns, the tribunal should generally
order “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances,”
which may include “individual notice to all identifiable members”
and/or “the publication or broadcasting of notices in newspapers, on
television or via other forms of media.” 162 Certainly, general
standards for the notification of absent class members should be
adopted for international class arbitrations.163
Another unresolved issue is determining if the arbitrator or the
domestic court should decide whether and to what extent a class
should be certified. While there are rulings holding that the arbitrator
should decide and others explaining that such determination lies
158. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 23435.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 5.
Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 233.
A European Form of Class Arbitration?, supra note 12, at 63.
FED. R. CIV. P. (23)(c)(2); Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 5.
Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62, at 730.
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within the courts competence, 164 it is submitted that the arbitral
tribunal has broad powers to conduct the proceedings and that
domestic courts should only assist the arbitrator when needed.
4. Early Resolution
Some types of domestic class actions provide defendants with
the opportunity to file a motion for dismissing a defective class
action. Although such motions might be more unusual in the field of
arbitration, an efficient international class arbitration procedure
should be structured considering the potential importance of
dispositive motions to avoid creating a time- and cost-consuming
process for adjudicating massive disputes when the claims are clearly
flawed.165
5. Cost and Fees
It is logical that the fees of the arbitrators will likely be higher in
class arbitrations than in other international arbitration disputes and
proportionate to the additional commitment of time. For instance, the
arbitrators would be required to address additional procedural issues
not present in traditional arbitration, such as whether the arbitration
agreement allows class arbitration, certification of the class and notice
requirements. The process can also involve disputes between various
claimants and the claimants with their counsels, objections to
settlement, among several other issues at each stage of the
proceedings. Similarly, the lawyers’ fees might require an adjustment,
especially in those countries where contingency is not allowed.166 If a
decision on costs is favorable to the defendant, collecting the fees will
be a challenge as well.167
The discussion regarding costs and fees illustrates how useful
the involvement of institutional arbitration centers could be for
developing international class arbitration procedures. For instance, the
arbitral institution could determine a system to fix the fees of the
arbitrators. Such a system would not have to leave such decisions to
the discretion of arbitrators.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 17-18.
Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62, at 731.
Id.
See Dana H. Freyer & Gregory Litt, Desirability of International Class Arbitration,
2 CONTEMP. ISSUES IN INT'L ARB. AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS, 171, 179-180
(2008), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Publications2487_0.pdf.
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6. Scope of Court Assistance: Hybrid Procedure?
While international commercial arbitration has been
characterized as an autonomous dispute resolution mechanism in
which the arbitral tribunal is empowered to render a final decision,
class arbitration has showed a higher involvement from domestic
courts than traditional arbitration, mainly as a result of practical
concerns. Certification of the class members and notice requirements
are some of the issues over which domestic courts might exercise
supervisory powers in order to guarantee the procedural rights of all
class members.168
It is submitted that arbitrators are as well-equipped as courts to
protect the integrity of the arbitral process in international class
arbitrations. This is why domestic courts should show deference and a
favorable attitude towards the powers of the arbitral tribunal to
conduct class arbitrations, just as in any traditional international
arbitration proceeding. 169 Applying the principle of minimum
intervention and neutrality, domestic courts should assist arbitral
tribunals only if needed, acknowledging their powers and the
independence of the arbitral system.
7. Pleading Standards
Pleading requirements are usually not required in arbitration.
Accordingly, some authors have explained that class arbitration faces
the challenge of determining whether these or other similar standards
should be inserted into class arbitration as a protection for defendants.
An example is provided by the 1995 US Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, which sets heightened requirements for federal securities
class actions pleadings.170 It is submitted that no additional pleading
requirements should be applied to international class arbitrations.
8. Discovery
An essential concern regarding international class arbitration is
determining how the arbitral process will address discovery. As in
securities or product liability, claimants might have little or no
relevant knowledge other than what is publicly available, which
makes discovery extremely important to the claimants and also puts
168. Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?, supra note 8, at 257.
169. HANOTIAU, supra note 2, at 276.
170. Freyer & Litt, supra note 167, at 173.
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an uneven burden on the defendant to settle. It has been explained that
if discovery is “sharply limited, as it often is in international
arbitration, this could substantially alter the balance of power in class
actions.”171
D. Enforcement Challenges
1. Challenges to International Enforcement
International arbitration rules and principles recognize that
arbitral awards are binding and that the parties must comply with the
decision without any delay. While there is a high level of voluntary
compliance,172 recognition and enforcement before domestic courts is
still necessary in several cases.173
Enforcement raises a number of concerns with respect to awards
issued in class arbitration proceedings. As provided in Article V(1)(a)
of the New York Convention, recognition and enforcement of class
arbitration awards could be refused when “the award was rendered on
the basis of an invalid arbitration agreement.” 174 Similarly, Article
V(1)(b) of the New York Convention could be used by a non-present
class member under an opt-out system to claim that it was not given
proper notice. Furthermore, Articles V(1)(d) and V(2)(a), which refer
to the appointment of the arbitrators, the procedure, and arbitrability,
could also be brought against the recognition and enforcement of
class arbitration awards.175
The most likely objection to recognition and enforcement of
international class awards will be based on notions of individual
procedural rights, a central principle of constitutional law in many
jurisdictions.176 As explained by an author, “state courts, particularly
those in civil-law countries, will have to consider whether and to what
extent they should permit foreign conceptions of rights to be enforced
in arbitration” because even where a jurisdiction “domestically
prohibits the use of representative actions in its own courts, that may
171. Id. at 179.
172. International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, PRICEWATERHOUSE
COOPERS 1, 8 (2008), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123294.pdf.
173. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 624.
174. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 29.
175. Id. at 29-30.
176. Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public
Policy Concerns, supra note 63, at 7.
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not be an adequate reason rising to the level of international public
policy for the state’s courts to refuse enforcement on a wholesale
basis.” 177 Accordingly, all these issues should be addressed by the
parties and the arbitral tribunal from the outset of the proceedings,
taking into consideration that arbitrators have a duty to render an
enforceable award according to “national laws, institutional rules,
ethical codes and scholarly writing.”178 It is submitted that domestic
courts should follow a firm pro-arbitration policy, generally
permitting the enforcement of international class awards.
2. Risk of Review
International class arbitration faces several obstacles in
jurisdictions providing the parties with the possibility to review the
class arbitration award before domestic courts. The basis for review
might open the door to unsatisfied class members or defendants
challenging the award, for instance, on the grounds of an alleged
violation of the right to be heard (especially in opt-out systems) or
based on the fact that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction under the
relevant arbitration agreement (especially regarding validity and
arbitrability issues). 179 For instance, the Swiss Private International
Law Statute allows the parties to challenge the award based on
allegations of lack of jurisdiction and for violation of the right to be
heard as well. 180 An arbitration award could be appealed under
German law for similar reasons.181
3. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are those awarded not only to compensate a
party, but also with the purpose of punishing and deterring the
wrongdoer as well as others from pursuing similar conduct. Although
typically present in class actions, these last two functions–punishment
and deterrence–could be a problem in the international arena because
they are not accepted in all jurisdictions, especially in civil law
countries. This might lead domestic courts to refuse recognition and
177. Freyer & Litt, supra note 167.
178. Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory Rules of Law in International
Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELB. J. INT’L L. 205, 215 (2005).
179. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 28-29.
180. LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LOI DE DIP] [Swiss Private
International Law Statute] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291.435.1, arts. 190(2)(b), (d) (Switz.).
181. Nater-Bass, supra note 21, at 29.
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enforcement of the class award under the public policy exception
established in Article V(2) of the New York Convention.182
Some authors have argued that awarding punitive damages
should not necessarily be considered as a valid ground for refusing
enforcement. Accordingly, domestic courts “should construe the
public policy defense in a very constrained manner,” only applying it
in extreme instances. 183 This is the only way that international
arbitration may function as an efficient mechanism to resolve
transnational business disputes. They explain that otherwise “the
entire regime of international arbitration that is largely based on the
certainty of enforcement created by the New York Convention
[would] be severely undermined.”184
4. Settlement, Voluntary Dismissals, and Compromise
Class action proceedings bring several challenges of
administration and fairness in connection with potential settlements.
This is why US courts have incorporated the duty to analyze the
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of settlements as an element of
due process.185 Arbitral tribunals will certainly have a similar duty,
although it has been explained that arbitrators should be prepared–just
as judges–to anticipate “poorly equipped class representatives and
attorneys, inadequate class settlement provisions, and overly generous
fee stipulations.”186
Similarly, the administration of settlements requires “compiling
and maintaining mailing lists of class members and providing
adequate notice, collecting and evaluating individual proofs of claim
from each class member who wishes to benefit from the settlement,
and managing the investment and distribution of settlement funds.”187
As explained, arbitral tribunals “ordinarily become functus officio
after they render an award, whereas courts are available to resolve
disputes about class award distribution long after a judgment is

182. See Jessica Jia Fei, Awards of Punitive Damages, JONES DAY 28-29 (2003), http://
www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/75b937bb-b41b-4971-b7a0-49c4bff2ec21/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/905d1ac6-50ba-4695-87c0-718ef9772f4a/JiaFei_Punitive_Damages.
pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
183. Id. at 34.
184. Id.
185. Freyer & Litt, supra note 167, at 178.
186. Id. at 179.
187. Haber Kuck & Litt, supra note 62, at 731.
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rendered.” 188 It is submitted that these issues should be addressed
from the outset of the proceedings. However, arbitrators are wellequipped to assume a preeminent role in international class
arbitrations, with the appropriate assistance of arbitral institutions and
specialized companies that have professionalized the settlement
administration industry.
CONCLUSION
The future of international class arbitration remains uncertain.
However, it is expected that these procedures will become more
popular in the coming years as the use of different mechanisms for
collective redress has increased in several jurisdictions and some class
action disputes have already been observed in a transnational level.
Accordingly, the international arbitration community should
implement a uniform regulatory framework addressing the particular
challenges of international class arbitration.
It is submitted that an international class arbitration procedure
should be crafted to guarantee an efficient and informal process,
recognizing the full authority of the arbitral tribunal, and with
minimum intervention from domestic courts. An express agreement to
arbitrate should always be required. While there should not be a
problem when the parties explicitly consent to class arbitrations, the
arbitral tribunal should be deemed empowered to decide whether a
class action is admissible when the arbitration agreement is silent.
Similarly, the arbitrators should have the authority to determine
whether class arbitration waivers are valid and effective under the
applicable law.
Allowing representative relief under an opt-in or opt-out system
is of the essence. However, at the moment, opt-out procedures seem
to present too many problems for international class arbitrations. Optin systems guarantee that all participants are made aware of and have
fully consented to class arbitration, considerably reducing the risks of
class member claims that they had no possibility of participating in
selecting the arbitrators, presenting their case, or being actively
involved in the proceedings. Unnamed class members choosing to
participate in the arbitration will be deemed to have ratified the choice
of arbitrators made by the class representative as well as the
subsequent positions and actions adopted during the course of the
188. Freyer & Litt, supra note 167, at 179.
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proceeding. Therefore, adopting an opt-in system enhances the
chances of enforcing the award.
Bifurcating the proceeding between a class certification stage
and the hearing on the merits is also advisable. Certainly an efficient
international class arbitration process should also encompass the
opportunity to file dispositive motions in order to avoid a time- and
cost-consuming process when the claims are clearly defective.
Confidentiality in international class arbitrations must also be
protected to the extent possible, although it should be acknowledged
that disclosing relevant information to potential parties is essential,
especially in opt-in systems. Thus, almost certainly some confidential
aspects of the dispute shall be disclosed to implement an effective
international class arbitration procedure.
The international arbitration community should support the
enforcement of class awards under the New York Convention,
showing that the presumption of enforceability that is usually granted
to international awards also includes these special types of collective
proceedings. The arbitrators should carefully consider the applicable
law in light of their duty to render an enforceable award, as issues of
arbitrability or punitive damages could compromise the effectiveness
of the international class arbitration process.
An international class arbitration procedure could be established
under soft or hard law provisions. For the moment, arbitral
institutions should play a key role by providing arbitration rules
specifically dealing with international class arbitrations, because the
complexity of these procedures advises that they should be crafted
and supervised by highly competent experts. This would offer an
opportunity to discuss relevant issues by experts and stakeholders
worldwide. If the procedure proves to be suitable for transnational
business disputes, most institutional arbitration centers shall join the
trend and jurisdictions could implement these procedures under their
own domestic laws.
As class arbitration has been criticized by some renowned
international institutions and most companies are not supportive of
widespread class arbitrations, the international arbitration community
should support the development of international class arbitration and
show the advantages of adopting specific rules of procedure.
International class arbitration increases the efficiency and reduces the
costs of the proceeding, as companies can avoid having to arbitrate
numerous single disputes and claimants are offered the opportunity to
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bring a claim when the individual amounts do not justify initiating an
individual proceeding. In addition, international class arbitration
secures access to justice, guarantees that all the parties are treated
equally and prevents different tribunals issuing conflicting decisions
when confronted with the same set of facts.
While the international legal community discusses a basis for a
common regulation of international class arbitrations, it is submitted
that any regulatory framework should aim to secure an efficient and
fair procedure inclined towards rendering an enforceable award and
acknowledging the procedural rights of all the parties involved.
Ultimately, as international commercial arbitration is a system praised
for offering a predictable and efficient mechanism to resolve
transnational business disputes, the legal community should promptly
implement a specific set of rules for international class arbitrations
that avoids uncertainties and addresses its special features.
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